Author Archives: Rafael Gonzalez, Esq.

About Rafael Gonzalez, Esq.

Rafael Gonzalez, Esq. is President of UnitedHealth Group/Optum’s Workers Compensation and Auto No-Fault Settlement Solutions. With 35 years of social insurance experience, he oversees the organization’s mandatory reporting, conditional payments and set-aside allocation services. He is engaged in workers’ compensation, social security and Medicare/Medicaid legislative processes at both state and federal levels and is a frequent speaker on these substantive issues. Rafael, a subject matter expert in his field, shares his knowledge and expertise on social media and at He is based in Tampa, FL and can be reached at or at 813.967.7598.

MAP and PDP Private Cause of Action Suits Not Just a Fad

If you are keeping up with Medicare Secondary Payer (MSP) trends and updates, then you know that Medicare Advantage Plans (MAPs) and Prescription Drug Plans (PDPs) private cause of action suits continue to be the rage, with case law arising in federal district and circuit courts across the country. When you add the recent announcement from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) that Medicare Advantage premiums will decline while plan choices and new benefits increase, it’s no wonder enrollment is projected to reach a new all-time high with more than 36 percent of Medicare beneficiaries expected to be enrolled in Medicare Advantage in 2019. With more Medicare beneficiaries switching from Medicare Parts A and B traditional coverage to Part C Medicare Advantage coverage, more and more of these MAPs will be providing your insured, and therefore your potential claimants, with Medicare benefits related to your claim. So, if you thought MAP and PDPs’ Medicare Secondary Payer private causes of action were a fad, think again.

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New York Federal District Court Reminds that CMS Right to Reimbursement of Conditional Payments from Beneficiaries Accrue Only After a Primary Payment

051816_1352_VirginiaFed1.jpgOn July 11, 2016, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York published its opinion on Sexton v. Medicare, concluding the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim; thereby granting the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) motion to dismiss. The Court reminds us all that although Medicare’s right of action to recover overpayments from primary payers accrues as soon as it learns that payment has been made or could be made under workers’ compensation, any liability or no-fault insurance, or an employer group health plan, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) right of action against beneficiaries only accrues after the beneficiary has received a primary payment – a settlement, judgment, award or other payment.

Facts and Historical Background

On December 6, 2014, Kevin Sexton (plaintiff) was struck by a distracted driver in the Bronx. According to the complaint and police report, the driver of the other car was a licensed taxi or limousine driver insured by American Transit Insurance Company (ATIC). Plaintiff alleges that he suffered injuries including fractures of his tibia and fibula as a result of the accident and had a rod placed in his leg.

Because plaintiff was a Medicare beneficiary, Medicare paid certain medical expenses related to the December 6, 2014 accident. On February 3, 2015, the CMS, which administers Medicare on behalf of the HHS, sent plaintiff and his attorney a letter notifying him that Medicare had conditionally paid medical expenses totaling $678.60 for treatment of his accident-related injuries. The February 3, 2015 letter stated that plaintiff “may be required to reimburse Medicare for medical expenses.” The letter was clear, however, that plaintiff was not yet being billed. The letter stated, in bold type: “THIS IS NOT A BILL. DO NOT SEND PAYMENT AT THIS TIME.”

On June 10, 2015, CMS sent a fundamentally identical letter to plaintiff and his attorney identifying an additional $25,262.15 in conditional payments for medical expenses arising from plaintiff’s December 6, 2014 accident. Based on a letter filed by plaintiff on June 27, 2016, further payments have since been made by Medicare on plaintiff’s behalf.

Following his receipt of the February 3, 2015 letter from the CMS, plaintiff filed the instant action seeking to compel Medicare “to recover the funds from American Transit Ins. Co. or from the providers that Medicare knowingly paid by mistake instead of from” plaintiff. Defendant subsequently served a motion to dismiss on plaintiff, which plaintiff did not timely oppose. After defendant’s motion was filed, the court provided plaintiff with additional time to file an opposition. When plaintiff again failed to respond to defendant’s motion, the court deemed the motion fully briefed.

Defendant moved to dismiss this action on two bases. First, “defendant argues that plaintiff’s claim is not ripe for judicial review because plaintiff has not suffered an actual or imminent injury where defendant’s right to collect any purported Medicare overpayments from plaintiff rests on contingent, future events that may not occur.” Second, “defendant contends that plaintiff failed to avail himself of and exhaust administrative remedies and satisfy the prerequisites to defendant’s waiver of sovereign immunity and, thus, the action must be dismissed.”

The Medicare Secondary Payer Act

Where payment has been made, or can reasonably be expected to be made for medical expenses under a primary plan, Medicare generally will not pay the medical expenses42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A). If a primary plan has not made or cannot reasonably be expected to make payment promptly, however, Medicare may conditionally pay for medical expenses42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(i). Medicare may later seek reimbursement from a primary plan or an entity that received a payment from a primary plan42 U.S.C. § 1395y (b) (2) (B) (ii) (“A primary plan, and an entity that receives payment from a primary plan, shall reimburse Medicare for medical expenses if it is demonstrated that such primary plan has or had a responsibility to make payment”) 42 C.F.R. § 411.24(b). “A primary plan’s responsibility for such payment may be demonstrated by a judgment, a payment conditioned upon the recipient’s compromise, waiver, or release (whether or not there is a determination or admission of liability) of payment for items or services included in a claim against the primary plan or the primary plan’s insured or by other means” 42 U.S.C. § 1395y (b) (2) (B) (ii).

The government’s right to recoup overpayments permits it to recover directly from beneficiaries who receive primary payments42 C.F.R. § 411.24(g) (“CMS has a right of action to recover its payments from any entity, including a beneficiary that has received a primary payment”). If CMS determines that it has a right of recovery against a beneficiary, the agency will issue an “initial determination” identifying the “recovery claim against a beneficiary for services or items for which Medicare already paid.” 42 C.F.R. § 405.924(b) (14). The initial determination by CMS is administratively appealable42 C.F.R. §§ 405.940-978; 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.1000-1054, 405.1100-1140. After exhausting administrative appeals, an unsatisfied beneficiary may seek judicial review of the Secretary’s final decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (b) (1) (A) “Judicial review of claims arising under the Medicare Act is available only after the Secretary renders a ‘final decision’ on the claim.”

Plaintiff Lacks a Claim That is Ripe for Adjudication

Defendant first argues that “the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s action because plaintiff has not suffered an actual or imminent injury.” Defendant contends that “Medicare’s claim for reimbursement has not yet accrued because no event has triggered a primary insurer’s obligation and plaintiff has not been requested to reimburse the program.” In other words, because Medicare may never become entitled to reimbursement from plaintiff, defendant posits, there is no live dispute between the parties.

Although CMS has the right of action to recover overpayments against primary insurers “as soon as it learns that payment has been made or could be made under workers’ compensation, any liability or no-fault insurance, or an employer group health plan,” 42 C.F.R. § 411.24(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii) its right of action against beneficiaries only accrues after the beneficiary has received a primary payment.42 C.F.R. § 411.24(g) (“CMS has a right of action to recover its payments from any entity, including a beneficiary, provider, supplier, physician, attorney, State agency or private insurer that has received a primary payment.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii), which says “the United States may recover under this clause from any entity that has received payment from a primary plan or from the proceeds of a primary plan’s payment to any entity.”

Plaintiff contends that “Medicare has improperly sought to recover purported overpayments directly from him, rather than from the insurer of the driver of the vehicle that struck him.” The February 3, 2015 letter CMS sent to plaintiff stated explicitly, however, that it “IS NOT A BILL” and that plaintiff should “NOT SEND PAYMENT AT THIS TIME.” The letter merely explained that plaintiff “may be required to reimburse Medicare for medical expenses related to his liability claim.”

The Court explains that “Medicare may eventually determine that a primary insurer is responsible for covering medical expenses related to plaintiff’s injuries. In that case, it may seek reimbursement against the primary insurer or, if plaintiff has received a payment, against plaintiff himself.”42 U.S.C. § 1395y (b) (2) (B) (iii). In other words, “if a primary insurer directly reimburses Medicare for all of the purported overpayments, Medicare would not seek repayment from plaintiff himself. Alternatively, Medicare may determine that there was no overpayment.” As the above hypothetical situations illustrate, plaintiff’s alleged injury is purely conjectural. Because he “alleges only a potential for injury that has not yet occurred and because that potential is born of nothing more than hypothesis and conjecture,” the Court concludes plaintiff lacks standing to sue.

As noted above, on June 10, 2015, plaintiff received a nearly identical letter naming additional conditional payments made by Medicare on plaintiff’s behalf. The June 10, 2015 letter, like the February 3, 2015 letter, provided that plaintiff “may be required to reimburse Medicare.” It did not establish Medicare’s right of recovery against plaintiff. Additionally, on June 27, 2016, defendant filed a letter with the court explaining that further conditional payments had been made by Medicare on plaintiff’s behalf. The letter, however, explained: “HHS is not aware of any events at this time that would give rise to a claim for recovery against Plaintiff under the Medicare Act.” Even if events since the filing of the complaint had demonstrated Medicare’s right to recover overpayments, plaintiff was obligated to establish his standing to sue at the outset of the litigation.


Because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s claim against defendant, the court need not address defendant’s alternative arguments. For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction.

The court reminds us all that although CMS has the right of action to recover overpayments against primary insurers as soon as it learns that payment has been made or could be made under workers’ compensation, any liability or no-fault insurance, or an employer group health plan, right of action against beneficiaries only accrues after the beneficiary has received a primary payment. That rule not only applies to beneficiaries, but also to providers, suppliers, physicians, attorneys, state agencies or private insurers that have received a primary payment. In other words, Medicare may recoup reimbursement from any entity that has received payment from a primary plan or from the proceeds of a primary plan’s payment to any entity.


HHS Secretary Announces Changes to Combat Nation’s Opioid Epidemic

Medicare Part D Prescription CoverageThe abuse of and addiction to opioid analgesics is a serious and challenging public health crisis in the United States. Deaths from drug overdose have risen steadily for the past two decades and are now one of the leading causes of injury death in our country. Prescription medications, notably opioid analgesics such as hydrocodone, oxycodone, morphine and methadone used to treat acute and chronic pain, have been increasingly implicated in drug overdose deaths over the last decade. National statistics show that from 1999 to 2013, the rate for drug poisoning deaths involving opioid analgesics nearly quadrupled. As a result, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has taken several steps to address opioid analgesic misuse and abuse1. Earlier this month, HHS Secretary Sylvia M. Burwell announced changes in an effort to further address this challenge. The actions, which were announced2 on July 6, 2016, include:

  • Medication Assisted Treatment (MAT): Buprenorphine Final Rules

The announcement states that “expanding access to MAT is one of the three foundational priorities of the HHS Opioid Initiative, and buprenorphine is one of the drugs frequently used for MAT.” As a result, rules finalized by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) allow “practitioners who have had a waiver to prescribe buprenorphine for up to 100 patients for a year or more to now obtain a waiver to treat up to 275 patients.” The announcement makes it clear that “practitioners are eligible to obtain the waiver if they have additional credentialing in addiction medicine or addiction psychiatry from a specialty medical board and/or professional society, or practice in a qualified setting as described in the rule.”

  • Pain Management Survey Scores No Longer Tie to Medicare Payments to Hospitals

Regarding pain management survey scores, the announcement also indicates that many clinicians felt pressure to overprescribe opioid analgesics because scores on the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) survey pain management questions are tied to Medicare payments to hospitals. However, those payments have a very limited connection to the pain management questions on the HCAHPS survey. As a result, “in order to mitigate even the perception that there is financial pressure to overprescribe opioid analgesics, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) is proposing to remove the HCAHPS survey pain management questions from the hospital payment scoring calculation.” Thus, the announcement makes it clear that hospitals will continue to use the questions to survey patients about their in-patient pain management experience, but will not affect the level of payment hospitals receive. 

  • Indian Health Services Prescribers and Pharmacists Required to Check Database

While many Indian Health Service (IHS) clinicians already utilize Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP) databases, IHS will now require its opioid analgesic prescribers and pharmacists to check their state PDMP database prior to prescribing or dispensing any opioid analgesic for more than seven days. Effective immediately, the new policy applies to more than 1,200 IHS clinicians working in federally operated IHS facilities currently authorized to prescribe opioid analgesics. Additionally as a part of this work, “IHS will train hundreds of Bureau of Indian Affairs law enforcement officers on how to use naloxone, and provide them with the life-saving, opioid overdose-reversing drug.” 

  • New Research and Scientific Studies on Opioid Misuse and Pain Treatment

Secretary Burwell’s statement reaffirms that research on opioid analgesics conducted and funded by HHS helps the department better track and understand the epidemic, support the development of new pain and addiction treatments, identify evidence-based clinical practices to advance pain management, reduce opioid analgesic misuse and overdose, and improve opioid analgesic use disorder treatment. These areas of research are critical to our national response to the opioid epidemic. As a result, HHS will launch more than a dozen new scientific studies on opioid analgesic misuse and pain treatment to help fill knowledge gaps and further improve our ability to fight this epidemic. As part of this announcement, the department released a report3 and inventory4 on the “opioid misuse and pain treatment research being conducted or funded by its agencies in order to provide policy-makers, researchers, and other stakeholders with the full scope of HHS activities in this area.” 

  • Prescriber Training Request for Information

In the announcement HHS confirms that it is actively working to curb the overprescribing of opioid analgesics in a number of ways. This includes providing prescribers with access to the tools and education they need to make informed decisions. In particular, HHS has developed a number of activities that support opioid analgesic prescriber education. As a result, HHS seeks comment on its current prescriber education and training programs as well as proposals that would augment ongoing HHS activities. The department released an infographic5 and fact sheet6 on actions HHS has taken and plans to take to address the opioid epidemic. 

Whether stemming from a workers’ compensation injury, auto accident or a slip and fall, a therapy plan often includes an opioid analgesic. It is therefore important for stakeholders know, keep up with and understand the various changes being implemented to mitigate situations of opioid analgesic misuse and abuse. As always, we will continue to monitor such changes and report on the same.


North Carolina Federal Court Finds Provision on Anticipation of Medicare Eligibility within 30 Months of Settlement Does Not Concede Potential Social Security Disability

051816_1352_VirginiaFed1.jpgOn June 1, 2016, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina published its opinion on Boone v. Colvin, concluding that in deciding Plaintiff’s credibility pertaining to her Supplemental Security Income (SSI) application, the administrative law judge (ALJ) incorrectly used a portion of the workers compensation settlement agreement addressing future Medicare eligibility. Because the issue was entitlement to SSI, not Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB), the fact that the settlement agreement indicated there was no reasonable expectation that Plaintiff will be Medicare eligible within thirty months of the settlement, did not mean Plaintiff conceded or agreed she was not disabled under the Social Security Administration rules for SSI benefits.

Case History

Ms. Boone, the Plaintiff in this case, had an accident in the course and scope of her employment on December 2, 2004. As a result of her industrial accident, she suffered a disc herniation at L4-5, which was initially treated with pain management. Ultimately, she had an artificial disk implantation on February 5, 2007. Thereafter, she reached maximum medical improvement on July 5, 2007 with permanent light duty restrictions and a 15 percent partial disability rating. After negotiating with her employer/carrier, on March 30, 2009, she agreed to and was awarded a $75,000 settlement by a workers’ compensation judge, terminating any and all entitlement to indemnity and medical benefits she may have had pursuant to the North Carolina workers’ compensation law. After attorney fees and costs, she netted $56,000.

The workers’ compensation settlement agreement contained a provision regarding future medical benefits. Because she was not then a Medicare beneficiary, had not applied for social security disability benefits and was not within 30 months of reasonably anticipating becoming a Medicare beneficiary, the agreement included language stating “it is not the intention of the instant settlement agreement to shift responsibility for future medical benefits to the federal government. Having considered Medicare’s potential interest in future medical expenses, the parties have agreed no Medicare set aside amount is necessary by way of this claim. In determining no set aside is necessary, the parties considered various matters, including but not limited to the following: Plaintiff is not Medicare eligible and there is no reasonable expectation that Plaintiff will be Medicare eligible within the next thirty (30) months. It is noted that the future need for medical care and treatment is disputed in this case as previously noted in this agreement. It is further noted that this settlement agreement specifically forecloses the possibility of future payment of medical benefits incurred after the date of the settlement agreement.”

Although the opinion does not indicate whether at a previous point the Plaintiff may have been insured for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB), by the time she applied for social security benefits, she was not insured for DIB, therefore applied only for Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Almost six years after her date of accident, and more than three years after her settlement, Plaintiff filed an application for SSI on July 14, 2010, alleging a disability onset date of December 2, 2004, her workers’ compensation date of accident. The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, and a request for a hearing was timely filed. While waiting for the hearing to be scheduled, on May 9, 2011, the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (NCDHHS) allowed Plaintiff Medicaid benefits.

On February 9, 2012, a video hearing was held before an ALJ. The ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s claims on March 9, 2012. Plaintiff timely requested review by the Appeals Council. More than a year later, on April 15, 2013, the Appeals Council allowed the request and remanded the case with instructions that the ALJ further evaluate Plaintiff’s medically determinable mental impairments, evaluate the May 9, 2011 decision by the NCDHHS allowing Plaintiff Medicaid benefits and give further consideration to Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (RFC), providing appropriate rationale for it with specific supporting references to evidence of record.

On December 5, 2013, a second hearing was held before a different ALJ On March 24, 2014, the ALJ issued a decision again denying Plaintiff’s claim for SSI. Plaintiff timely requested review by the Appeals Council. More than a year later, on June 25, 2015, the Appeals Council denied the request for review. Almost 11 years after her date of accident, and more than 5 years from the date of her application for SSI, on August 31, 2015, Plaintiff commenced this proceeding for judicial review of the ALJ’s decision.

Administrative Law Judge Findings

Plaintiff was 42 years old on the date she filed her application for SSI and 45 years old on the date of the hearing, therefore considered a younger individual. 20 C.F.R. § 416.964(b)(3). The ALJ found that she had at least a high school education. 20 C.F.R. § 416.964(b)(4). The ALJ further found that Plaintiff had past relevant work as a driver, fire watcher, transporter and child care provider.

Applying the five-step sequential evaluation analysis of 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4), the ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the date of her application. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following medically determinable impairments that were severe within the meaning of the Regulations: post-laminectomy syndrome, lumbosacral spondylosis and chronic back pain. At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically equal any of the Listings.

Due to concerns about the Plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ next determined that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform a limited range of light work. Based on her determination of Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ found at step four that the Plaintiff was not capable of performing her past relevant work. At step five, the ALJ accepted the testimony of the vocational expert and found that there were jobs in the national economy existing in significant numbers that the Plaintiff could perform, including jobs in the occupations of silver wrapper, routing clerk and advertising material distributor. The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled from the date of her application, July 14, 2010, and therefore not entitled to SSI.

Evaluation of the Workers’ Compensation Agreement

On appeal, Plaintiff asserted that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed and SSI benefits awarded or, alternatively, that the case should be remanded for a new hearing on the principal grounds that the ALJ erroneously evaluated the state Medicaid decision and the workers’ compensation settlement into which Plaintiff entered into on March 30, 2009 in determining Plaintiff’s credibility.

At the second step of the assessment, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s allegations were not fully credible. The ALJ stated that “the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her symptoms are not entirely credible.” The ALJ provided specific reasons for her credibility determination, including an assessment of the workers’ compensation agreement.

The ALJ deemed the “not reasonably eligible for Medicare within 30 months of settlement” provision inconsistent with Plaintiff’s claim of disability. In other words, the ALJ found that because the claimant herself agreed in the workers’ compensation settlement agreement there was no reasonable expectation she would become Medicare eligible within 30 months; in effect, “she conceded that she agreed she was not disabled under the Social Security Administration rules at that time.”

Improper Use of Medicare Eligibility Provision to Evaluate Credibility

On appeal, Plaintiff contends that “the agreement and the specific Medicare eligibility provision does not relate at all as to whether or not she meets Social Security requirements.” The court finds merit in this point indicating that “while entitlement to a period of disability and disability insurance under Title II of the Act (DIB) establishes entitlement to Medicare benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 426(b)(2)(A)(i), entitlement to SSI does not. Plaintiff’s agreement to the provision could reflect simply Plaintiff’s pursuit of SSI rather than DIB.”

The Commissioner of the SSA agrees that the ALJ was evaluating the Medicare eligibility provision from a DIB perspective and that the ALJ erred in doing so. “The Commissioner concedes that the ALJ’s interpretation of the agreement was ill-founded.” The Commissioner argues, nonetheless, that the ALJ’s error in discounting Plaintiff’s credibility on the basis of the provision in the workers’ compensation agreement is harmless. She cites to the other significant evidence the ALJ discusses in support of her credibility assessment. The court here however indicates that “while the evidence is admittedly extensive, the court cannot say that the ALJ’s error was harmless.”

One reason is that the ALJ did not indicate the weight she gave the inconsistency she found between the provision in the workers’ compensation agreement and Plaintiff’s claim of disability. “The decision fails to foreclose the possibility that the ALJ’s error significantly tainted her view toward Plaintiff’s credibility and her evaluation of other evidence bearing on Plaintiff’s credibility.”

Moreover, Plaintiff’s claim of disability relies substantially on her allegations of pain and other limitations resulting from her back impairment. “Because symptoms, such as pain, sometimes suggest a greater severity of impairment than can be shown by objective medical evidence alone, any statements of the individual concerning his or her symptoms must be carefully considered if a fully favorable determination or decision cannot be made solely on the basis of objective medical evidence.” Soc. Sec. Ruling 96-7p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 4, 1996 WL 374186. Thus, “the credibility of Plaintiff’s statements about her pain and other symptoms and their functional effects are of particular importance to the propriety of her disability claim.”

In addition, the court here alludes to the fact that Plaintiff was not well equipped to understand the interrelation between DIB, SSI, Medicare, Medicaid and workers compensation. “She is not a lawyer and does not have a college degree. As noted, the ALJ found at one point that she obtained a GED, but only had an

eighth grade

education. While Plaintiff expressly represented in the workers’ compensation agreement that she had read and fully understood it, the implicit concession the ALJ found arguably falls outside the scope of simply understanding the agreement. There does not appear to be any evidence showing that Plaintiff’s lawyer or anyone else explained to her any impact the provision in question could have on a claim by her for Social Security disability-based benefits. The ALJ herself does not appear to have properly understood the statutory interrelation on which she grounded her finding.”


The court concludes that the ALJ committed prejudicial error in her evaluation of Plaintiff’s credibility. As a result, the court recommends this case should be remanded for further administrative proceedings. In making this ruling, the court expressed no opinion on the weight that should be given to any piece of evidence, as that is a matter for the Commissioner to decide.

Although this is an SSI case, which sometimes affects Medicare eligibility, this is a worrisome case for many reasons. First, it clearly demonstrates that even when injured individuals stipulate in their settlement agreements there is no reasonable anticipation of Medicare enrollment within 30 months of settlement, when injured individuals apply for benefits and allege a retroactive date of disability onset which matches the date of accident, if successful, Medicaid or Medicare coverage may also become effective within 30 months of the date of the settlement. Those who have been following Medicare Secondary Payer compliance over the last fifteen years see CMS pursuit of a primary payer or applicable plan for reimbursement of any conditional payments it may make related to the accident that gave way to eligibility for benefits and therefore Medicare coverage.

Second, the case shows how the language and ideas expressed in a workers compensation, auto, longshore, medical malpractice, no-fault, products, or general liability settlement, agreement, release or stipulation matter and may be significant to other parties, including federal agencies like the SSA and CMS. As the ALJ did here, it is no longer unthinkable for an ALJ deciding entitlement to DIB benefits, which has a direct correlation to Medicare, to use the language regularly included in such agreements when contemplating MSP compliance to conclude that no anticipation of Medicare eligibility within 30 months of settlement means the claimant concedes he or she is not disabled.

Third, the case provides a blue print for potential federal false claims. Given the direction that false claims case law has gone over the last several years, it is no longer inconceivable to think that the federal government would interpret the language used by litigants, such as the parties in this case, as a purposeful shift to taxpayers for the future responsibility of any and all medical expenditures related to the settled non group health plan claim.

As part of our MSP compliance services, Optum Settlement Solutions offers a review of clients’ settlement release, agreement or stipulation by our legal team to ascertain if Medicare’s interests have been properly considered and appropriate protective language has been included. Our legal team, with years of experience as claims handlers, trial attorneys, appellate lawyers and MSP compliance counselors, will discuss ideas and strategies as well as provide recommendations and suggested language to comply with MSP statutory, regulatory and case law mandates.